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Human agency is the new frontier of contemporary philosophy. You may 
have noticed it already — that the Berlin Wall of the determinism / free-
will dichotomy will soon be coming down, and a new paradigm of human 
action will sprout from seeds both new and long dormant. There have been 
hints of the impending cataclysm already: the work of Antonio Damasio 
in neuroscience,1 Thomas Metzinger and Alicia Juarrero in the philosophy 
of the self,2 Ananta Giri in development ethics,3 and François Jullien along 
with David Hall and Roger Ames in comparative philosophy. We’ve taken 
it for granted for so long — despite the best efforts of compatibilist philos-
ophers, we’ve lulled ourselves into believing that we can have it only one 
of two ways — that either we choose or we merely appear to choose, super-
naturalism or robotics. The former is incoherent, and the latter is too chill-
ing to take seriously when our own phenomenological experience separates 
us far enough from its plausibility that we are comfortable keeping it out of 
mind. In human robotics there could be only discomfort, especially for the 
humanist philosopher who relies on genuine human decisions when formu-
lating the barest of propositions, the imperative to believe. 
This essay will not bring the wall down single-handedly. It will, how-
ever, endeavor to carve out a chink, generate a crack that branches as it 
spreads. My approach will be from the narrow subject of transitivity as a 
linguistic feature. Transitivity, which implies at least one kind of agency, is 
a nice starting point because in this narrow ﬁeld the eventual complications 
already begin to show themselves, but in a manageable sphere. 
The heart of education is the student–teacher relationship, which can 
be construed in a number of ways. In François Jullien’s Detour and Access, 
he identiﬁes Confucius’ style of education as relying on indirection: “The 
ideal of Confucian speech is not to promote dialogue but to imitate nature’s 
indirect manner of operation” (p. 202).4 This reluctance to enter into dia-
logue appears to be in direct conﬂict with the Socratic method, often lauded 
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as the paragon of Western education. Socrates used dialogue in an attempt 
to access universal truths that everyone had encountered but could not 
immediately recollect. Confucius, Jullien argues, attempts to incite reﬂec-
tion in the student with the purpose of assisting the student to comport to 
the demands of circumstance (p. 213). Jullien cites Fan Chi’s comparison 
of a teacher to falling rain: “which, without anyone knowing, makes every-
thing grow” (p. 202). By contrast, the heart of the Socratic relationship is 
the guidance of the teacher. 
It is often noted that the root of the English word “education” is the 
Latin educare, cognate with educere, both having connotations of “to 
lead,” hence the English word “educe,” to draw forward. This perspec-
tive on education implies two important things: (1) that the teacher knows 
where the student needs to go, and (2) that the teacher knows the way to 
the student’s destination. This very active role of a teacher in education is 
revealed also in the grammatical designation of “to educate” as a transi-
tive verb.
Syntactic monotransitivity, as linguists call it, refers to the characteris-
tic of some verbs to indicate a transfer of action from an agent to an object, 
or patient. Common examples are “to throw” and “to touch.” The lin-
guists Paul Hopper and Sandra Thompson5 ﬂeshed out the concept of tran-
sitivity by identifying ten components of it, each lying on a continuum, that 
together could allow one to identify the effectiveness with which an action 
is transferred to an object/patient, in other words, the level of transitivity. 
The components they identify are participants, kinesis, aspect, punctual-
ity, volitionality, afﬁrmation, mode, agency, affectedness of the object, and 
individuation of the object. It turns out that there is one aspect of transi-
tivity that this nearly exhaustive examination does not consider, and that is 
the agency of the patient. Etymologically, “patient” indicates passivity, but 
is the recipient of action always passive?
In what follows, I will attempt to draw out a few implications with 
regard to the education of a recipient of action who is active rather than 
passive. In the process of doing so, I will need to introduce a novel term 
and a novel use of an obscure term, “intertransitivity” and “numisma-
tism.” I shall begin with the numismatic.
Imagine a blank screen. Appearing on the screen are four circles of 
identical size. In each of two of the circles is an image of a person’s head — a 
man in one and a woman in the other. In each of the other two circles are 
images of a plant in one and a building in the other. These four images, 
you come to realize, are faces of coins of undetermined nations. Because 
they are unfamiliar to you and the denominations are not apparent, it is 
impossible to pair up the sides as they appear on the actual coins. The task 
is impossible because it is of the nature of coins that the two sides, while 
attached, cannot, under normal circumstances, be viewed simultaneously, 
and because the conditions of their unity are entirely contingent. There is 
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no way while viewing one side to be privy to the contents of the other side 
or to deduce the connection. 
This intriguing feature of coins is an appropriate metaphor for intersub-
jective experience. The term “coin” is a single one that refers to an object 
with two discrete perspectives. Many intersubjective experiences also have 
a single term that refers to two isomorphic but experientially distinct per-
spectives, such as “commerce” and “exchange.” Each of these terms can be 
broken down into two perspectives, each described by a distinct term. For 
“commerce,” there is “buying” and “selling”; and for “exchange,” there 
is “giving” and “receiving.” In form, these two perspectives are identical, 
each an agent of a commercial transaction. Experientially, however, they 
are quite the opposite: one selling, with all of the concerns and expecta-
tions that selling entails; and one buying, with very different concerns and 
expectations. 
Often, the intersubjective experience does not have a distinct term to 
identify it and instead borrows one of the opposing terms, such as “lend-
ing,” “parenting,” teaching,” and “leading.” Each of these terms implies 
an opposing pair. In these instances, the experience differential is more 
readily apparent. A lender has a borrower, a parent has a child, a teacher 
has a student, and a leader has a follower — each with a particular perspec-
tive. In rare instances, a single lexical root captures not only the experience 
but both sides of it as well. An example is “employment.” An employer 
employs an employee.
Whether coming in three distinct terms, coming in a pair in which one 
does double duty, or coming singly, in which one covers all three, numis-
matic terms convey the sense of a single experience that is apprehended 
from two radically different perspectives. Take as an example the delivery 
of a conference paper. It is intersubjective in that it involves the listener on 
one side and the speaker on the other. In an obvious sense it can be singly 
conceived as a conference talk. This term “conference talk” is itself per-
spective-free and does not describe the experience of any single person. 
And yet it cannot be understood unless at least two subjects are participat-
ing in the experience from radically different perspectives. It is, after all, a 
very different experience to be standing in front of a group of people offer-
ing ideas and sitting as one of a group trying to grasp new ideas. Because 
these two radically different perspectives are uniﬁed in the talk, one can 
refer to the entire experience as numismatic, coin-like, in nature. 
You have probably noticed that these terms describing numismatic 
experience have different levels of transitivity. For instance, a conference 
talk involves ditransitivity: two objects, one of which is indirect — “The 
speaker delivers the paper to the listener.” Some are more obviously mono-
transitive, as in “X employs Y.” In none of these, however, is there a patient 
in the strictest sense of the term — as a passive recipient of action. Some 
experiences involving two people do have an agent acting on a patient, 
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such as a nurse dressing or bathing a comatose person in a hospital — here 
a patient in two senses. But such cases would not be intersubjective.
Intersubjective experience expands the sense of transitivity to a point 
that traditional conceptions of “transitive” do not capture. The indirect 
object in the case of ditransitivity is not an object at all but an agent with 
an integral part in the experience. To say that I buy someone a book, how-
ever, is not in the least misleading, because it is understood that the object 
being bought is the book and not the person. The case of monotransitivity 
is more ambiguous.
The structures of the sentences “X teaches Y” and “X touches Y” 
are identical and analyzed grammatically as S-V-O, with the “object” in 
the case of “teaches” sometimes called a “patient” in reference to he or 
she being animate. But isn’t a student, in the most meaningful sense of the 
term, more than just animate? Isn’t a student, after all, an active agent of 
experience? To describe the agent-verb-agent construction of intersubjec-
tive experience, I have coined the term “intertransitivity.” In an intertran-
sitive construction, action is predicated on both sides of the verb, not in 
the sense of bidirectionality, but in the sense that in order for the deliver-
ing agent’s goal to be realized, the receiving agent must play a cooperative 
role. 
Try to develop a list of intertransitive verbs — verbs in which the recip-
ient of the action must play a cooperative role for the verb to be meaning-
fully carried out under its normal sense: to lead, to question, to marry, to 
promote, to scold, to help, to kiss, to love. For each of these verbs, if the 
recipient of action is noncompliant, the action itself becomes meaningless 
in the normal sense of the verb. This is unlike the case with other transi-
tive verbs, such as to touch, to emulate, to see, to sentence, and to divorce, 
all of which can be effected with full force on a noncompliant recipient. 
The notion of intertransitivity becomes especially interesting in cases that 
at ﬁrst appear to be merely transitive, such as to marry, to scold, to love, 
and to oppress. In legalistic terms, marriage can be conducted on a mono-
transitive basis only; but to be fully meaningful, it has to be intertransitive. 
Gandhi discovered that the same goes for oppression.6 A people cannot 
be oppressed if they refuse to be a party to oppression; if they retain their 
agency, they can be imprisoned but not oppressed. Try scolding a child 
who refuses to accept blame, or try helping someone who does not wish 
to be helped. Immediately, you realize that intertransitivity requires mutual 
agency, and recognizing this can have practical advantages.7 
Education is an interesting case. Here is a numismatic experience with 
a typical transitive construction of X educates Y, in which one gets the dis-
tinct impression of a subject acting on a patient. It helps to refer to the 
Latin root to bring out the intertransitivity: X is leading Y, and for it to 
be meaningful, Y has to take an active part by following. Socrates could 
accept this, but Confucius, according to Jullien, would not be satisﬁed at 
stopping here. For Confucius, the active role of the intertransitive follower 
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must indeed be active, to the point that the so-called follower must take 
the initiative.
The Responsiveness of the Agent as Object
A transitive verb carries the action from the subject to the object, or patient. 
An intertransitive verb identiﬁes an intersubjective, or numismatic, expe-
rience with an action that involves two agents in an isomorphic but expe-
rientially distinct relationship of mutuality. The relationship differential 
accounts for the transitive nature of the action, as if it were being car-
ried over from one to the other. The agency of the object (of the receiving 
agent), however, complicates this description. In Confucian education, the 
receiving agent is not merely compliant: he or she is the instigator. Learn-
ing for Confucius is pragmatically prior to teaching; following is pragmat-
ically prior to leading. How can we make better sense of this?
In Jullien’s examination of Chinese poetics in Detour and Access, he 
identiﬁes allusive incitement (xing) as the most important, and character-
istically Chinese, trope in the tradition. Unlike symbolic representation, 
which presents a speciﬁc idea by way of reference to a speciﬁc object, allu-
sive incitement uses reference to generalized features of the world to evoke 
nonspeciﬁc emotions in the reader. According to Jullien, the achievement 
of this effect relies as much on the reader as on the poet. The reader must 
(1) achieve a state of quietude, (2) be receptive (he calls it “inner availabil-
ity”) to the incitement, and (3) reﬂect on it (p. 156). As a result, the read-
er’s interiority opens up to the landscape and to a web of emotional asso-
ciations. Finally, “the mind is not led to see but moves as it pleases” (p.
190). This is the height of Chinese poetics, as well as the height of Confu-
cian education.
An easy way to understand this kind of poetics, perhaps, is by think-
ing of the difference between realistic and abstract painting. Whereas real-
ist painting is taking you in a speciﬁc direction, abstract painting sets you 
off through associations that you yourself bring to the painting. In this 
sense, traditional Chinese ink-wash painting, which has been criticized as 
cartoon-like by those expecting realism, is more akin to abstract paint-
ing than to realist painting. As in Chinese poetry, the allusions run deep, 
and so someone steeped in the tradition and open to the literary and artis-
tic allusions that are presented is able to achieve a level of receptiveness 
that allows for the emotional incitement to take affect. This is unlike West-
ern expressionism and other modernist and postmodernist expressions of 
aesthetic emotion in which the artist emotes with the purpose of express-
ing particular emotions. The Chinese painter and poet allude and incite, 
and the viewer or reader responds spontaneously. The painter and poet’s 
job is to raise a scaffolding of richly but subtly evocative form and syntax 
within which the viewers or readers move according to their own predis-
positions. 
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The Chinese term xiuxing is often rendered into English as “self-culti-
vation.” Whereas the Chinese means literally to build, improve, or repair 
one’s behavior, the horticultural metaphor in the English (but absent from 
the Chinese) is serendipitously appropriate and demonstrates to us that our 
own tradition is not devoid of the important idea that education can be 
viewed as cooperative. Like “to educate,” the term “to cultivate” also goes 
back to Latin and meant originally what it still means today — to foster the 
growth of something. How does this term ﬁt with the notions of numis-
matic experience and intertransitivity? On the surface, it seems unrelated. 
If I am fostering the growth of the philodendron on my desk in Michigan, 
I don’t normally take the philodendron to be an agent engaged in an inter-
subjective experience with me. But why don’t I? Is it because the philoden-
dron is not a person and therefore incapable of agency? Where does the 
ontological boundary of agency lie? What about a dog — is it capable of 
agency? If so, what does a dog bring to the experience that a philodendron 
does not? A dog, if you allow, brings a mind, and a mind brings intention, 
and intention brings directionality through desire, impulse, choice — what-
ever mental characteristics you would like to attribute to the dog.
I would like to suggest, contrary to much of the last 130 years of West-
ern philosophy, that the most fundamental aspect of agency is not inten-
tionality but sensitivity.8 A shift in emphasis from intentionality to sensi-
tivity provides a nice limit case from which to conceive education. In the 
cultivation of my philodendron, the philodendron is not a static, inanimate 
object. Rather, it has its own vectors of growth and a concomitant sensi-
tivity to its surroundings. In its proper place in nature, it would not need 
to enter into a relationship with me at all and would be able to realize its 
full potential through natural interactions with its environment, most of 
which are beyond our normal ken. In the impoverished environment of my 
ofﬁce, however, I must enter into an intersubjective relationship with it by 
fostering its growth. What is necessary for this fostering to occur success-
fully is that the philodendron itself must bring to the experience that vector 
for growth and that sensitivity to allow my fostering it to have its intended 
effect. In fact, my fostering is but a tiny part of its growth, and most of 
its poietic interactions are produced by the plant itself. I humor myself by 
thinking that most of the work is done by me and that the plant is a pas-
sive recipient of my largesse. And although I curse those plants that aren’t 
appropriately sensitive to my overtures, of course the mistake is mine. 
Responsive Education
The conclusion that I am heading toward is not that students need to be 
coddled like hothouse orchids but that, in any meaningful sense of the word 
“education,” they bring to the experience their own vectors of growth and 
sensitivity. The educational experience is numismatic. Although a teacher 
and student are in the same room together and discussing the same mate-
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rial, their perspectives on the experience are radically different. First, there 
is a practical power differential — the teacher can affect the student, pos-
itively or negatively, in ways that the student cannot reciprocate. Second, 
there is an authority differential — the teacher is in a position to pronounce 
right or wrong, and often, unfortunately, this is parasitic on the power dif-
ferential. Third, there is a knowledge differential — the student’s knowl-
edge base is scant, while the teacher’s, one would hope, is broad and deep. 
Fourth, there is an incentive differential — the teacher is there to earn a liv-
ing, and the student is there to get a grade. 
The verb “to educate” is intertransitive. Rather than involving a 
teacher who is transferring information to a passive student, the student 
must be an active agent in the interaction. In an ideal setting, according to 
Jullien’s Confucius, not only must the receiving agent be active, but he or 
she must initiate the experience for it to be meaningful. 
Now for the kicker: in a modern educational environment the numis-
matism and intertransitivity of the educational experience that are so inti-
mately related actually conspire against each other. The numismatic dif-
ferentials of the contemporary classroom strip the student of that motive 
agency, of the sensitivity and the vector for growth that education aspires 
to meet and foster. The student becomes more interested in the grade than 
in learning. The student defers to the teacher’s vast knowledge rather 
than exploring on his own. The student sits quietly so as not to offend 
the teacher. The teacher works as little as possible so as to get a paycheck 
while still holding on to his or her job. An originally intertransitive expe-
rience is reduced by intangible, and often unnoticed, numismatic differen-
tials to mere monotransitivity. 
And so the challenge of teachers today is to bridge the numismatic dif-
ferentials in order to renew the latent receptivity of the student and foster 
the growth that is there waiting to blossom. This recognition of the impor-
tance of agency in the student–teacher relationship lays a large part of the 
educational responsibility on the student, to be sure. In addition, it chal-
lenges the educator and administrators of the educational systems to do 
their utmost to foster this agency and allow it to develop along its natural 
patterns of growth. 
Conclusion
“Agency” is a term in need of redeﬁnition. It is not practical to say that 
because of its Aristotelian or Cartesian ontological connotations it can be 
dispensed with altogether. One cannot deny the phenomenological indi-
vidual or the individual’s actions. Even in a Deweyan transactional world, 
we have to be able to speak of the actions performed by A, in which case 
A is ascribed at least minimal agency — and therefore responsibility. The 
path to redeﬁning agency in such a way that it conforms to the current 
physics/metaphysics is to imbue it ﬁrst with the notion of sensitivity. Sen-
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sitivity brings both agent and world together through an internal prim-
ing (occurring phylogenetically — as with an infant — and historically) that 
readies the agent to be able to receive further information from the envi-
ronment and to use that input to respond appropriately. Sensitivity plus 
a sufﬁciently complex responsiveness (as in Juarrero), dispenses with the 
need for supernatural freedom and provides a dynamic path to action and 
responsibility that await further delineation. 
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